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Abstract
The European General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR), which went into effect in May 2018, leads
to important changes in this area: companies are
now required to ask for users’ consent before col-
lecting and sharing personal data and by law users
now have the right to gain access to the personal
information collected about them.
In this paper, we study and evaluate the effect
of the GDPR on the online advertising ecosystem.
In a first step, we measure the impact of the leg-
islation on the connections (regarding cookie sync-
ing) between third-parties and show that the gen-
eral structure how the entities are arranged is not
affected by the GDPR. However, we find that the
new regulation has a statistically significant impact
on the number of connections, which shrinks by
around 40%. Furthermore, we analyze the right
to data portability by evaluating the subject access
right process of popular companies in this ecosys-
tem and observe differences between the processes
implemented by the companies and how they inter-
pret the new legislation. We exercised our right of
access under GDPR with 36 companies that had
tracked us online. Although 32 companies (89%)
we inquired replied within the period defined by
law, only 21 (58%) finished the process by the dead-
line set in the GDPR. Our work has implications
regarding the implementation of privacy law as well
as what online tracking companies should do to be
more compliant with the new regulation.
1 Introduction
Today, online advertising is the most important
source of income for many websites, apps, and ser-
vices online. To individually target website visitors
with ads, tracking services gather personal data
without users’ explicit consent [47]. Whole busi-
ness models formed around collecting, sharing, and
using of such personal data (e. g., personalized ads,
analytic services [1,16,44], or malicious exfiltration
of such data [49]). This kind of data is seen as
an economic asset of a company [41]. As a result,
imbalance of power between data processors (ser-
vice providers) and data subjects (users) increased
in the last years. Often users do not know about
collection, usage, and are very often unaware of the
consequences [39]. They also had limited options if
they wanted to regain control of their data or even
try to understand what information is collected or
inferred about them.
To address some of these problems, the Euro-
pean General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)
introduced significant changes that affect how per-
sonal data can be collected and shared. The new
legislation went into effect on May 25, 2018. One
of its goals is to allow users to regain control of
the immaterial wealth of their personal data by
introducing additional possibilities like the right
to request a copy of their data, the right to era-
sure, and the need for services to explicitly ask
for consent before collecting or sharing personal in-
formation [48]. Compliance with the GDPR rules
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is required for any company that offers services in
the European Union—no matter where their head-
quarter is located. Furthermore, companies that
process personal data have to demonstrate that
they meet the GDPR criteria (e. g., encryption and
pseudonymization of personal data). Otherwise,
they risk a fine of up to 4% of the annual worldwide
turnover of the preceding financial year.
Previous studies have shown that tracking and
ID syncing happen in practice [1, 16]. Other works
found that the GDPR affected the adoption of pri-
vacy policies and cookie notices [13] and that it also
led to a reduction of tracking [10]. The data porta-
bility right and the effects of the GDPR on cookie
syncing have not been studied before.
In this work, we study the effects of the GDPR
on the online advertising ecosystem and focus on
the information sharing between ad services and
the implementation of the new right to data porta-
bility. More specifically, we measure the relations
of websites and third parties, and links of third par-
ties between each other, regarding ID syncing be-
fore and after the GDPR took effect. To do so, we
created 400 browser profiles each of which we used
to visit hundreds of websites to identify ID syncing
between third parties embedded in these websites.
We discovered a reduction in the number of third
parties and sharing connections. Additionally, with
the top third parties in our measurement, we exer-
cise our right of data portability and analyze the
process to handle the inquiries.
Next, we found that the GDPR has (statistically)
significant impact on the ID syncing phenomenon
between different third parties and we found that
third parties, in the ID sharing ecosystem, are of-
ten arranged like star topologies. The most impor-
tant tool for online services to inform users about
their data practices are their privacy policies, but
our results show that not all companies take the le-
gal obligations seriously. Regarding the new right
to data portability, we found that some companies
miss to finish the process within the legal period,
set up different obstacles, and provided data in var-
ious forms and detail levels.
To summarize, our study makes the following con-
tributions:
• We measure implications of the GDPR regard-
ing the use of third-party services by websites
and analyze the shift of relations between these
third parties in terms of ID syncing. To do
so, we construct an undirected graph that de-
scribes the relations between third parties and
websites. Based on empirical measurements
over a period of six months, we show that the
general structure of relations is not affected,
but the amount of ID sharing is reduced, by
over 40%.
• Furthermore, we requested access to our per-
sonal data from 39 companies and analyze the
success of the subject access requests regard-
ing, e. g., workload or timing. We found that
58% of the companies did not finish the process
within the legal period and that the workload
to get access varies heavily depending on the
inquired company.
• Finally, we examine the subject access request
process of each company in detail and report
on obstacles (e. g., affidavits), data provided by
the companies (e. g., clickstream data), and in-
formation provided by companies complemen-
tary to data provided in their privacy policy
(e. g., specific partners who got access to our
data).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We
give background information most relevant for our
work in Section 2 and describe our measuring ap-
proach in Section 3. we determined the most promi-
nent companies in our dataset (Section 3.3 and
evaluated the privacy statements regarding their
compliance to the GDPR (see Section 4.3).
2 Background
The following sections give an overview of the
GDPR’s relevant regulations as well as the techni-
cal background of tracking and sharing in the online
advertisement ecosystem.
2.1 General Data Protection Regu-
lation
The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR
or Regulation 2016/679) [48] is a regulatory ini-
tiative by the European Union (EU) to harmonize
data protection laws between its member states.
After a transition period of two years, it was finally
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put into effect on May 25, 2018. The GDPR spec-
ifies under which circumstances personal data may
be processed and includes several rights of data sub-
jects and obligations for those processing personal
data of EU-citizens. Online advertising companies
need to specify, for example in their privacy policy,
for what purpose they collect and share data. We
leverage these new transparency requirements and
user rights (of which the right to retrieve a copy
was newly introduced) to shed light on some of the
practices of online advertising services.
GDPR articles 13 to 15 specify what information
a data controller needs to provide in a privacy pol-
icy or upon request. This includes contact data,
information about the purpose of data processing,
categories of what data is used, with whom data is
shared or how it was obtained, and whether it is
used for profiling. In addition, article 20 specifies
a user’s rights to receive a copy of data processed
about her. For any information request, including
those to data access, the GDPR specifies that they
must be answered within one month (Art. 12, No.
2), but can be extended by two months. If the data
controller needs more time, they must state that
within a month and give an explanation(”That pe-
riod may be extended by two further months where
necessary, taking into account the complexity and
number of the requests”).
The right to retrieve a copy of data stored about
a data subject is described in Art. 20. According
to recital 68 of the GDPR (recitals describe the rea-
soning behind regulations), the right to data porta-
bility is meant to support an individual in gaining
control over one’s personal data by allowing access
to the data stored about him or her “in a struc-
tured, commonly used, machine-readable and inter-
operable format”.
Also relevant to our study are new regulations on
profiling which is defined in Art. 22 as:
any form of automated processing [...]
to analyze or predict aspects concern-
ing that natural person’s performance at
work, economic situation, health, per-
sonal preferences, interests, reliabil-
ity, behavior, location or movements;
Any company that infers information like inter-
ests about an individual for advertising purposes
performs profiling and needs to disclose this. How-
ever, they are not necessarily bound to the addi-
tional requirements for profiling mentioned in the
respective Article 22, e. g., to enable human inter-
vention, as profiling for advertising purposes most
likely does not have any legal or significant effects.
Some tracking companies claim that the data
they use is not personal information because it is
pseudonymized (see Section 4.3). If this was true, it
would free them from any data protection related
obligations. But the Article 29 Working Group,
a committee of European data protection officials,
has made clear in 2010 that storing and accessing
a cookie on a users device is indeed processing of
personal data since it “enable[s] data subjects to
be ’singled out’, even if their real names are not
known,” and therefore requires consent [3]. The
document is written with respect to the previous di-
rectives, but the assessment has been confirmed by
court rulings that, e. g., found IP addresses, some-
times also considered pseudonyms, to be personal
data. Relevant for our study is the clarification
that ad network providers, and not those that em-
bed the third-party scripts on their websites, are
responsible for the data processing. It is argued
that, since advertisers rent the space on publisher
websites set cookies linked to their hosts, they are
responsible for the data processing.
Organizations representing the online advertis-
ing industry interpret some of the legislation differ-
ently. The Interactive Advertising Bureau (IAB)
Europe has published a working paper for data sub-
ject requests in April 2018 [21]. They focus on two
provisions that limit the data processor’s obliga-
tions to answer requests from individuals. First,
Article 12 states that a data controller does not
need to act on requests if they “demonstrat[e] that
[they are] not in a position to identify the data sub-
ject.” Second, Recital 64 of the GDPR states that
data controllers should “use reasonable measures to
verify the identity of a data subject who requests ac-
cess” to make sure they do not give away personal
information to someone that is just impersonating
someone else to get access to information. The ar-
gument is that if the data is used in a pseudony-
mous fashion, i. e., a cookie ID, data subjects need
to prove that the information connected to that ID
is actually about them. Still, the guidelines argue
that services should make individual decisions as
to how they respond to those requests, and should,
e. g., not provide clickstream data but information
about the segments an ID is assigned to.
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2.2 Advertising Economy
Displaying ads is the most popular way to fund
online services. In 2016, the online advertising in-
dustry generated $72.5 billion Dollars in the United
States [38], while it generated e 41.8 billion Euros
in Europe in 2017 [17]. The modern online ad-
vertisement ecosystem is quite complex and is, in
a nutshell, composted out of three basic entities
which are described in the following [51].
On the one end, there are publishers and web-
site owners that use supply-side platforms (SSP)
to sell ad space on their sites. On the other end,
the demand-side platform (DSP) is used by market-
ing companies to organize advertising campaigns,
across a range of publishers (SSPs). To do so, they
not necessarily have to select a specific publisher
they want to work with, but can define target users
based on different criteria (e. g., geolocation, cate-
gories of websites visited, or personal preferences).
A data management platform (DMP) captures and
evaluates user data to organize and optimize digital
ad campaigns. They can be used to merge data sets
and user information from different sources and use
that data to automate campaigns on DSPs. To do
so, a DMP often collects IDs of different systems
and merges data with those from other sources to
target ad campaigns to a specific audience based
on high-level information like interests.
User tracking and profiling are important parts
of a website’s or other application’s (e. g., mobile
applications) business model [1,16,44]. Profiles are
based on the users’ clickstream (a list of websites a
user has visited) to enable target advertising [8,11].
To do so, a unique digital identifier is assigned to
each user, either by the server or computed based
on properties of the user’s device (called device fin-
gerprinting [16]). The most prevalent way to store
such digital identifiers on a users device are HTTP
cookies. While this is considered an undesirable
privacy intrusive behavior by some, it is in practice
a fundamental part of the online ad economy to
perform so-called Real-time Bidding (RTB). RTB
means that impressions and online ad space are
sold in real-time on automated online marketplaces
whenever a user visits a website.
Different approaches to counter user tracking
have been proposed [12, 31] and it was shown
that these approaches are often not very effec-
tive [35]. One reason for this is that user tracking
methods are continually evolving and sometimes
get highly sophisticated (e. g., using the HTML5
canvas tag) [15,16].
2.3 Cookie Synchronization
A HTTP cookie is a piece of textual data, strictly
limited in size, that can be set by a website to
store data locally on a client. In theory, cookies
contain simple name=value pairs but in practice,
they sometimes combine information through var-
ious means [23]. If a website visited by the user
directly sets a cookie, it is called 1st party cookie
(depicted in Figure 1 as (A)). A cookie is called
third-party cookie if the visited website embeds an
object from another domain and this third-party
sets a cookie (see (B) in Figure 1).
Cookies are intended to maintain a state between
different HTTP sessions, e. g., to remember user
preferences like items stored in the shopping cart,
or to log that a user has previously authenticated
with the server. Storing a unique user identifier in a
cookie (e. g., uid=1234-abcd-f1) allows a server to
identify a user that is revisiting the website. It is
also common that additional information exceed-
ing the size allowed for cookies is stored on the
server side in relation to that same ID. For on-
line advertising, this could be profile information
like interest segments or geolocation. A server can
only access a cookie under the domain that set it,
meaning that different third parties cannot access
each others cookies. This prohibits data leakage or
cross-domain tracking of different third parties by
merely accessing the cookies (via the same Same-
Origin Policy).
Cookie syncing is a process to bypass the Same-
Origin Policy by sharing the unique identifier of
a user between two third parties (see Section (C)
in Figure 1). Cookie syncing is mostly a two-
step process: (C1) A script from a third-party
(bar.org) is loaded into a website (example.org).
The request, that loads the script, is then redi-
rected, or the script itself issues a new request
to the syncing partner (sync.org). This redi-
rected request contains the ID bar.org assigned to
the user (e. g., sync.org?bar user id=XYZ ). Now
sync.org knows, via the HTTP referrer header or
additional information added to the request, that
the user with bar.org’s ID visited example.org.
If sync.org already has a cookie (e. g., from a pre-
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Figure 1: Different types of cookies: (A) a first party cookie—directly set by the visited website, (B) a
third-party cookie—set by a third-party embedded in the website, and (C) a synchronized cookie—shared
between two parties.
vious visit to another website) on the client, it can
pair bar.org’s user ID to its own. This allows
sync.org and bar.org to share data about the user
over another channel. This mechanism also allows
a tracker (sync.org) to track users on a large vari-
ety of websites even if these websites do not embed
the tracker but a partner of the tracker.
In most cases, the publisher of a website has little
to no influence on whether or not cookie syncing
is performed. From a privacy perspective, these
techniques have been criticized as personal data is
shared between several third parties without the
user’s knowledge or consent [36].
Re-targeting is a mechanism where an advertiser
(A) wants to target customers (C) with ads for
products she had showed interest in on A’s website.
To do so, A embeds an object from an ad company
(R), specialized in re-targeting users, onto every
website A runs which allows R to assign an ID to
A’s users. R syncs this ID to an ad exchange mar-
ketplace (M) so that M can identify if C visits any
website that uses M . Then, if C visits a website
that embeds M , M can inform A that C is cur-
rently visiting the website which makes it possible
for A to provide a targeted ad for C.
3 Measurement Approach
To gain insights into information sharing between
tracking companies and the impact of the GDPR
on these practices, we first conducted a measure-
ment study of cookie syncing in the browser. To
better understand the sharing practices not observ-
able through this method, we leveraged GDPR ac-
cess rights and performed an in-depth study on the
subject access request (SAR) process for companies
in the online ad economy.
3.1 Measurement Framework
To measure the extent of tracking and information
sharing, we used the openWPM [16] platform. For
our first study, we deployed the platform on two
computers at a European university. Note that a
European origin of our web traffic was necessary
to later be able to refer to European legislation.
We chose not to use a scalable web service (e. g.,
Amazon EC2) to automate our measurement since
it might be easier for a website to detect such au-
tomated crawls [27]. For comparison, we also con-
ducted one evaluation using US-based IP addresses
(see below).
With openWPM we logged all HTTP request and
response headers, HTTP redirects, and POST re-
quest bodies as well as various types of cookies
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(e. g., Flash cookies). We did not set the “Do
Not Track” HTTP header and did allow third-party
cookies. We used some “bot detection mitigation
techniques” (i. e., scrolling randomly up and down
on each visited website) to make it harder to detect
our crawler.
For our analysis, we created 400 browsing pro-
files. We chose the top 20 countries with the high-
est number of Internet users [45] and created 20
profiles for each country. For each of these pro-
files, we took the Alexa top 500 list of the corre-
sponding country [2] and randomly chose 100 to
400 websites to be visited. Finally, we randomly
visited three to five sub-sites from all links on the
websites that were hosted under the same domain.
Each profile had its own browser profile during the
analysis to make sure cookies could be separately
stored for each session. Furthermore, we randomly
assigned a popular user-agent string and a stan-
dard screen resolution to each browser profile that
remained constant during the analysis.
In October 2018, we performed one reference
measurement with US-based IP addresses via a
VPN connection to compare the results with Eu-
rope based traffic from the same time. Note
that VPN services can potentially inject content
(e. g., ads) into the traffic that might affect the re-
sults [29]. However, the Terms of Service did not
state that this might happen nor have we found any
information about content injection for this VPN
service.
3.2 Identification and Mapping of
Third-Party Relations
To analyze the sharing of personal or digital iden-
tifiers (IDs), we first had to filter them out. For
every visited domain, we analyzed the HTTP GET
and POST requests and split the requests at char-
acters that are typically used as delimiters (e. g.,
’&’ or ’;’). As a result, we obtained a set of ID
candidates that we can store for later analysis as
key-value pairs.
We identified IDs according to the following
rules, which are applied to every ID candidate pair
we find during the extraction phase. Note that the
rules are inspired by the work of Acar et al. [1]:
• Eliminate all ID candidates that were observed
for multiple profiles. Every identifier should be
unique to each user profile (e. g., we eliminate
the candidates c1 = (p id, 1234abcd) and c2 =(p id, 1234abcd) if they were observed in two
different browser profiles).
• Eliminate ID candidates with the same key
but where values differ in length. We ex-
pected that IDs are of consistent length (e. g.,
the candidates c1 = (data, 3rw3) and c2 =(data, 70g63b5g) would be eliminated).
• Eliminate candidates whose values do not con-
tain enough entropy (according to the Ratcliff/
Obershelp pattern recognition algorithm [40])
to contain an ID. Since we only observe a small
fraction of the potential ID space, we expect
that IDs to differ significantly (e. g., the candi-
dates c1 = (id, AAAC) and c2 = (id, AABA)
would be eliminated).
• Exclude candidates whose length is too short
to contain enough entropy to hold an ID. To
provide enough entropy to differentiate be-
tween individual users, we expect an ID to
have at least eight characters (e. g., the can-
didate c = (key, 1hgtz) is excluded).
To measure the syncing relations of third
parties, it is necessary to identify URLs—
that contain user IDs—inside a request (e. g.,
foo.com/sync?partner=https%3A%2F%2Fbar.
com%2F%3Fid=abcd-1234). To do so we attempt
to decode (e. g., BASE64) and deflate (e. g., gzip)
every HTTP GET and POST argument. Since
any of these arguments might be encoded/inflated
multiple times, as observed by Starov et al. [44], we
repeated this process multiple times (if necessary).
We used regular expressions to parse the decoded
values for URLs. When an URL was found, we
check if this URL has GET parameters that might
be an ID, according to our previously described
definition of an ID.
We used the WhoTracks.me database [10] to
cluster all observed third-party websites based on
the company owning the domain. These clusters
served as nodes for the construction of a graph and
added two types of edges to the undirected graph
to connect the nodes: (1) directs relations (i. e.,
a websites embeds a third-party object), and (2)
syncing relations (i. e., two third parties that per-
form cookie syncing). Thus, we can measure (1)
how many websites make use of a specific third-
party, and (2) with how many other third parties
IDs were synced.
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Figure 2: Shares of observed companies in terms
of directly embedded (black) and actively syncing
cookies (gray).
3.3 Analysis Corpus
During the first measurement (see Section 4.1), we
extracted the top 25 third parties embedded by
websites as well as the top 25 third parties that
engaged most in cookie syncing. In total, we iden-
tified 36 companies (third parties) which we refer
to as analysis corpus (see Table 3 in Appendix C).
In the remainder, if not stated otherwise, our anal-
yses always refer to this corpus. In three cases we
were told to address our inquiry to another com-
pany (e. g., subsidiary or the parent organization).
Thus, our corpus consists of 39 companies.
The complexity to measure that ecosystem is
highlighted in previous work [5, 25]. To the best
of our knowledge, there is no reliable public infor-
mation on market shares in the online advertising
ecosystem. Thus, we used the third parties which
are most popular in our experiment.
The top company that we did not include in the
corpus (i. e., the 26th most emended company) is
embedded by 0.12% of the visited websites and the
top cookie syncing company not included in the
corpus accounts for 0.58% of the syncing connec-
tions in the graph. The 39 companies in the cor-
pus account for 66% of all cookie syncing activities
(in the measurements we describe in Section 3.1)
while the reaming 33% are made up of 352 compa-
nies (i.e., there is a long tail). The companies in
the corpus represent 61% of the (directly) embed-
ded third parties. Due to the low share of the other
companies, we did not include them in our analy-
sis: contacting ten more companies (an increase of
19%) would only increase the amount of covered
cookie syncing by at most 5.8% or embedded web-
sites by at most 1.2%. The actual distribution is
also displayed in Figure 2.
The corpus consists of six SSPs, nine DSPs, seven
companies that specialized in targeted ads, four
DMPs, and 13 companies whose primary business
field is not directly tied to the ad economy but
instead utilizes ads to finance their services (e. g.,
RTL Group - a Luxembourg-based digital media
group, Facebook - an online social network and me-
dia company, or Verizon - a telecommunications
company).
While most of the companies in our corpus oper-
ate globally and run multiple offices, 82% have their
headquarters located in the United States. The re-
maining 18% are located in Europe (France, Lux-
embourg, the Netherlands, and the United King-
dom). This distribution is likely based towards
US/EU-based companies since we run our measure-
ments from Europe. This distribution is likely bi-
ased towards EU-based companies and a result of
our selection process from Alexa top lists of Euro-
pean countries. Since our goal was to measure the
impact of the new European legislation we expected
this bias and try to account for it in the analysis of
the results.
The observed third parties are not a complete
list of all companies involved in online advertising.
Some third parties might only be used in specific
use cases (e. g., video playback), or different compa-
nies might be used based on the geolocation of the
user. We address this limitation in further detail in
Section 5.2.
3.4 GDPR requirements
We analyzed the privacy policies of all 39 compa-
nies described above to see whether they contain
the information required by the GDPR (see Sec-
tion 2). We specifically looked for information on
the data sharing practices and evaluated how data
subjects can exercise their rights. As described
above, data controllers are required to inform, be-
sides other things, about the legal basis for their
data collection, categories of companies they share
the data with, and how long the data is stored.
We do not report on observations that all policies
had in common but focus on the differences. On
the one hand, for example, the right to withdraw
consent has been implemented through various opt-
out mechanisms [13] that all services support and
are therefore not listed. On the other hand, few
services actually follow the Do-No-Track signal, al-
though it was designed as a common consent mech-
anisms. Therefore, we listed statements about the
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latter. We were also interested in how companies
deal with the requirements regarding profiling: If
they use profiling, they are expected to describe the
logic involved in this process, although the debate
about what that should include is still ongoing [42].
Privacy policies should list the rights of the data
subjects, e. g., to object to the processing and the
possibility to access the data and they should de-
scribe how these rights can be exercised.
3.5 Assessing the SAR Process
One goal of the GDPR is to give users possibil-
ities to regain control of their personal data. In
order to test to which extend users can actually ex-
ercise these rights, we contacted the companies in
the corpus and looked for a preferred way of con-
tacting them in their privacy policies. According
to Art. 13 and 14 of the GDPR, companies need
to provide contact details of a responsible person
(e. g., the Data Privacy Officer) to handle privacy-
related requests. Most companies named a general
email address to handle such requests or referenced
a web form which can be used to access the data.
To access the personal data companies stored
associated with a cookie ID, we created a profile
specifically for this process. We used openWPM to
randomly visits websites that include third parties,
owned by the companies in our analysis corpus.
From these websites, all internal links (subsites)
are extracted and visited in a random order. For
this analysis, we kept the session active and contin-
ued visiting websites while we requested informa-
tion about the profiles. After running the profile
for approx. 72 hours, we extracted the ID key-
value pairs from the cookie store and cookie syncing
requests. This openWPM instance was left running
until the end of our analysis in order to keep the
cookies active.
When sending out inquiries, we included all
cookie ID values and domains for which we ob-
served ID syncing (with the corresponding ID key-
value pairs). If we could add custom text to our re-
quest (via email and in some web forms), we asked
four questions regarding the usage of our data:
1. What information about me/associated with
that cookie do you store and process?
2. Where did you get that information from? Did
you get it from third parties?
3. Do you use the data to perform profiling?
4. With whom do you share what information
and how?
A template of the emails can be found in Ap-
pendix A.
We used informal language (e. g., we did not
quote any articles from the GDPR nor did we use
any legal terminology) because we wanted to as-
sess the process when an “average user” wants to
exercise his/her right to access the data. In pre-
vious work on vulnerability notifications, a more
technical and formal language was used by the au-
thors [32, 46]. From our point of view, the situ-
ation is different because we wanted to exercise a
right and not inform someone regarding a security
problem.
An “average user” might have trouble to access
the information we added in our mails (e. g., the
correct cookie value). However, some companies
offer easy ways to access the information we in-
cluded in our mails (e. g., a web form that automat-
ically reads the user ID from the browser’s cookie
store [43]). Thus, we assume that a user who has
privacy concerns can obtain this information and
usability improvements might follow in the near fu-
ture.
We conducted two rounds of inquiries. The first
round on June 20th, approximately one month af-
ter the GDPR took effect, and the second round
starting on September 21st, approx. four months
after the GDP took effect. This allows us to com-
pare how their process changes as companies get
more experienced with the GDPR in practice.
We used two newly created GMail accounts (one
for each round of contacting) to get in touch with
the companies and did not disclose that we were
conduction this survey as part of a scientific study
because that could bias the responses of the com-
panies ranging from not answering at all to giving
more precise responses than they usually would.
In our measurement, we used two deadlines. The
first deadline is the legal period defined in the
GDPR, 30 days after the inquiries (July 20th and
October 22nd), and the second, more relaxed dead-
line, is 30 business days after our inquiries (August
1st and November 5th).
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4 Results and Evaluation
We conducted seven measurements throughout six
months. The first measurement was performed be-
tween 19th of May 2018 and 23rd of May 2018,
just days before the GDPR went into effect, the
second one after the 25th of May 2018. The other
measurements were made in intervals of four to six
weeks after that. The graphs were used to measure
the extent of third parties and ID sharing between
tracking companies (Sections 4.2 and 4.1). In addi-
tion, we analyzed the privacy policies of companies
we requested data from (Section 4.3) and evaluated
the subject access requests (SAR) of the companies
(Sections 4.4 and 4.5).
4.1 Third-Party Sharing Ecosystem
We constructed a graph for each individual mea-
surement that represents embedded third parties
and information sharing networks (see Section 3).
The graphs are undirected, where each node repre-
sents a company and each edge represents ID sync-
ing between companies. Figure 3a illustrates the
number of nodes per measurement. The x-axis rep-
resents the number of nodes and the y-axis repre-
sents the calendar weeks. The light gray dot on the
left is the first measurement M#1 before the GDPR
came into effect and the further darker gray (black)
dots represent the corresponding other measure-
ments (M#2 to M#7). We performed two types
of linear regression analysis including the measure-
ment before the GDPR took effect (gray) and ex-
cluding (black) it. Both trends are significant (p-
values 0.00044 and 0.00175). Therefore, we deter-
mine that the GDPR makes a significant difference
in the slope of the regression lines and thus the in-
troduction of the GDPR resulted in a measurable
decrease in embedded third parties. As the trend
progresses, the trend continues to flatten out. Be-
fore the GDPR enforcement, the Graph M#1 con-
tained 12,304 nodes, 11,738 of which are isolated.
Isolated nodes have no connection to another node
and represent third-party companies that are em-
bedded into websites but do not perform cookie
syncing (e. g., a JavaScript library). Overall, the
number of third parties, isolated or not, decreases
over the course of our study.
Figure 3b shows the numbers of ID sharing con-
nections. Of particular interest is the reduction of
syncing relations by about 50% before and after the
introduction of the GDPR, which indicates that the
sharing of data is reduced — in terms of the num-
ber of direct syncing connections. The correspond-
ing linear regression analysis confirms that both
trends with (gray) and without the measurement
before the GDPR (black) are both significant (p-
values 0.0072 and 0.0022). This indicates that the
introduction of the GDPR resulted in less direct ID
syncing connections. To assess the GDPR’s impact,
we compared the regressions including (ypre, dot-
ted, gray lines) and excluding (ypost, dashed, black
lines) the pre-GDPR measurement. In both cases,
the slopes are lower which indicates that the around
25th of May the drop was significantly larger, but
also that the general trend is towards using fewer
third parties that also sync less. These results sug-
gest that companies removed several third parties
from their websites in order to avoid problems re-
garding the new legislation, an observation in line
with other studies [20,24].
Table 1 provides an overview of the connections
within the graphs. To measure whether the effects
on the number of third parties and syncing are inde-
pendent, we separated the graphs into subgraphs,
so-called components. Each component represents
a graph in which all nodes are connected to each
other by paths. M#1 has 59 components, with the
largest component containing 429 nodes. The per-
cent values reflect the reduction and always refer
to the initial graph M#1, so the number of com-
ponents is reduced from M#1 to M#7 by maxi-
mum around 56%. Another difference is the size
of the largest component that is reduced by up
to 47%. However, the median component size re-
mains stable at around two throughout all mea-
surements. This indicates that the introduction of
GDPR has no effect on the individual components.
Similarly, the algebraic connection is a measure for
the number of nodes and the number of connec-
tions between the nodes within the graph. The
lower the value, the fewer connections are present.
The values of the algebraic connection varies be-
tween positive 25% and negative 60% compared
to the initial measurement. The evaluation shows
that the total number of links in the graph fluctu-
ates, but numbers are similar comparing the first
and the last measurement (-3.4%). This shows
that, although individual measurements vary, due
to how the ecosystem works, the introduction of the
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(a) Number of nodes per measurement
(b) Number of syncing connections per measure-
ment
Figure 3: Regression lines of our measurements including the pre-GDPR measurement (gray) and ex-
cluding it (black).
GDPR has no direct effects on the structure of our
graphs. In comparison the reduction in the num-
ber of nodes, and therefore the number of third
parties involved in tracking, follows a downward
trend: Fewer third parties are present on websites
(see Figure 3a).
Comparing the results from computers in Europe
with our reference measurement via a US-based
service, we observed that the amount of cookie
syncing—in terms of ID syncing connections—for
website visits from the USA is about 15% above the
amount for similar visits from the EU, in a compa-
rable time (CW43).
The regression analyses performed verify that the
introduction of GDPR had a measurable impact on
the number of nodes and links. The number of com-
panies is decreasing, as is the number of direct con-
nections. The general trend is slightly downwards
but stabilizes again from the last measuring point.
The general graph characteristics, however, indi-
cate, just as the similar modularity and the similar
average clustering coefficient as well as the values
for the average degree, that the GDPR has not fun-
damentally changed the ecosystem, but resulted in
a general reduction of information exchange (see
also Appendix B).
As already mentioned, the results indicate that
the GDPR did not change the characteristics of the
ad ecosystem (e. g., cookie syncing still exists) but
has a significant impact on the amount of sharing
using this technique. This hints that companies are
sharing with a smaller number of partners. How-
ever, other studies show that tracking of smaller
CW
Connectivity
Components largest CP algebraic conn.
20 (M#1) 59 — 429 — 0.1187 —
21 (M#2) 38 −35.59% 296 −31.00% 0.1494 +25.86%
26 (M#3) 37 −37.29% 269 −37.30% 0.1071 −9.77%
28 (M#4) 30 −49.15% 277 −35.43% 0.0994 −16.26%
34 (M#5) 37 −37.29% 235 −45.22% 0.0818 −31.09%
38 (M#6) 26 −55.93% 225 −47.55% 0.0469 −60.49%
43 (M#7) 38 −35.59% 268 −37.53% 0.1146 −3.45%
Table 1: Overview of connected components (CP)
in the measured graphs, and the shift after the
GDPR took effect.
ad companies was reduced, while tracking by the
market leader (i. e., Google) grew [24].
4.2 Connections of Third Parties
As described above, we differentiated between di-
rect partners as well as indirect partners of a third-
party. “Indirect partners” are (recursive) partners
of a direct partner which is relevant for the classi-
fication below. We identified three types of third
parties (nodes): (1) nodes with predominately di-
rect partners, (2) nodes with only one partner but
a large number of indirect partners, and (3) part-
ners with a rather balanced amount of direct and
indirect partners. We labeled a node “central” if it
has four times more direct partners than indirect
partners, “outer” if it has four times more indirect
partners than direct partners, and balanced other-
wise. In our data set, we have 16 central nodes,
10 balanced nodes, five central nodes, and eight
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isolated nodes. The remaining nodes in the graph
(i. e., not present in the analysis corpus) are mostly
the outer corners in a star (see below).
We observe that the networks of cooperating
third parties are arranged in star topologies (Type
1). They have one central point which has many di-
rect syncing connections to partners (e. g., Google),
but these partners rarely sync with additional part-
ners. Other nodes with many indirect partners
(Type 2) often have few direct partners (often just
1) which are the central point of a star. Thus, these
companies are connected to all outer corners of the
star as indirect partners. Nodes with a balanced
amount of direct and indirect partners (Type 3) do
not have any other special characteristics.
Over the course of our study, we could observe
that the number of direct partners of most compa-
nies continuously decreased by up to 40% (83 less
direct partners). Five companies even got totally
isolated in our measured graphs and only two com-
panies gained direct partners. With respect to indi-
rect connections, we see a large fluctuation of part-
ners that can be explained by the fact that adding
one direct partner, who might be the center of an-
other star, can lead to a significant number of ad-
ditional indirect partners (sometimes hundreds of
indirect partners).
Our results show that embedding one third-party
into a website puts users at risk that their data
gets shared with hundreds of companies. Accord-
ing to the GDPR, companies do not have to disclose
with which partners they share which data with,
but only need to mention the categories of part-
ners (see Section 2.1). This leads to the problem
that users cannot verify who has received a copy
of information about them and leads to the ques-
tions how service provider can ensure that data is
deleted upon request.
Aside from the one dominating star, with Google
as a central point, we observe many smaller star
topologies who share IDs with each other. This is
in line with our observation of the communities in
the graph (see Table 1) and public announcements
of companies to build tracking infrastructures aside
from Google or Facebook [36]. The results further
show that our corpus includes nodes of all types.
The classification results of the companies in our
analysis corpus can be found in Appendix D.
4.3 Privacy Policies
In addition to the measurement of data sharing of
third parties in the real world, we also analyzed the
privacy policies of 39 companies to check whether
or not they fulfill the requirements described in Sec-
tion 3.4. The most relevant details are reported in
Table 5 (in Appendix F). The policies of all but
three companies fulfill the minimum requirements
for privacy policies. All companies offer the pos-
sibility to opt-out of their services and all but one
disclose that they share some information with oth-
ers, but only a few are transparent about who these
third parties are and what type of information is
shared. Only two of the policies disclosed and ex-
plain cookie syncing. Similarly, only eight mention
that they do or do not perform profiling. One com-
pany did not update its privacy policy since 2011
and contained false claims, for example, that IP
addresses are non-personal information. The low-
est amount of information that we were looking for
could be found in the privacy policy of Amazon.
All policies that mention the legal basis for pro-
cessing claim that they rely on individual consent
when processing data, but at the same time the ma-
jority does not adhere to the (not legally binding)
Do Not Track (DNT) standard, where information
about whether or not users want to be tracked is
conveyed in an HTTP header [34]. Instead, compa-
nies rely on implicit consent, meaning that as long
as a data subject has not objected to a data collec-
tion by opting-out, it is assumed that users are OK
with the data collection.
Differences can be found on topics specific
to GDPR. For example regarding the question
whether processed data that contains sensitive in-
formation (e. g., about race or health). While some
explicitly forbid to collect this information through
their services, others acknowledge that some inter-
est segments they provide might be health-related
e. g., about some beauty products. Only three com-
panies acknowledge that they process health infor-
mation, but do not discuss how this data is better
protected than the rest.
4.4 Subject Access Requests
Companies also provide different means to grant
data subjects access to their data. Table 5, shown
in Appendix F due to its size, lists the various forms
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through which users can retrieve a copy of their
personal data. To learn more about the sharing
of personal information and to fill the blank the
privacy policies had, we examined how third par-
ties adopt the new requirements of the GDPR (see
Section 2.1) and how they respond to our subject
access requests (SAR). We contacted the compa-
nies in our analysis corpus and tried to obtain a
copy of the data associated with a cookie ID to
evaluate the SAR process of each company. As de-
scribed in Section 3.5, we used GMail accounts to
get in touch with the companies. We did so on
June 20th, 2018 (round 1) and on September 21th,
2018 (round two). In the first round, we sent out
32 emails and used six web forms to get in con-
tact with each company. In the second round, we
sent 27 mails and used eleven web form because
the contact mechanisms had slightly changed. As
part of this process, we extracted the cookie ID val-
ues and up to five domains for which we observed
ID syncing (with the ID key-value pairs) from the
long-running profile in the e-mail. The GDPR re-
quires companies to grant users’ access to their data
within 30 days after their initial request. Since it
does not specify whether this referrers to business
or calendar days we marked two deadlines (dotted,
gray lines in Figures 4 and 5).
4.4.1 Response Types and Timing
We grouped responses in three types: (1) automatic
responses, (2) mixed responses, and (3) human re-
sponses. A message was categorized as “automatic”
if it was identifiable as sent automatically by a com-
puter system (e. g., a message from a ticket system
stating that our request was received). We labeled
a message mixed if the message did not directly re-
fer to any of our questions but only included very
generic information that respond to any privacy-
related request. We double checked this with mails
we got in both inquiry rounds. Messages that di-
rectly responded to our questions were labeled “hu-
man”. If we had any doubt, we labeled messages in
favor for the companies. Figure 4 shows amounts
and type of responses we got during our analysis.
We did not count status messages from ticket sys-
tems (e. g., a message stating that our ticket was
updated), but only looked at those messages that
contained an actual reply.
In our second round of inquiries, we received in
total less responses from the companies. This is
partly because we did not have to report any bro-
ken forms to the companies which explains the fever
human responses in weeks 1 and 2. However, we ob-
served that in our second round, companies did not
follow up further questions like they did in round
1 (e. g., if we asked for further clarification about
data sharing).
In round one during the first two weeks, we re-
ceived by far the most responses (51), while most
responses are labeled human (56.9%) and 25.5%
are labeled automatic. While the share of response
types stayed balanced, the number of responses sig-
nificantly decreased although we asked follow-up
questions. In round two, we labeled 17.4% of the
responses human, in week one and two, and 60.9%
automatic.
In round one, we received almost exclusively re-
sponses from human correspondents one week be-
fore the deadline. That changed in round two where
we got almost no responses anymore after week four
(3 in total). After the first deadline, we received
mostly human or mixed responses. One company
told us (in both rounds) that due to complexity
of our inquiry that they would need more time.
After the second deadline (30 business days after
our inquires), we still got human responses to our
questions (ten in round one and two in round two).
The companies that did reply after the first dead-
line often just referenced to their privacy statement
without addressing our questions directly.
Figure 4: Types and timings of the received re-
sponses.
4.4.2 Response Success
The amount of effort necessary to obtain access to
personal data differed depending on the inquired
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company. To asses the work load of the process
of a company, we use a simple scoring mechanism
that essentially takes four factors with different im-
pact into account: (1) amount of emails sent to
the company (Ci) before getting access to data as-
sociated to the digital ID (Mpre), (2) amount of
emails sent after getting access to the data (Mpost),
(3) actions that the user has to perform online
(Aonline), and (4) actions that a user has to per-
form offline (Aoffline). We differentiate between
emails because we interpret access to users data as
the primary goal of the request. However, there
might still be some open questions (e. g., if profil-
ing is performed) that were not answered by the
time the data was shared. An example of an ac-
tion that a user must perform online is that the
user has to enter additional data in an online form
(e. g., legal name). On the contrary, scanning the
user’s official identification document (e. g., pass-
port) is a typical example of task a user has to
perform offline. We created our “work load score”
as is because we wanted to penalize (1) if compa-
nies set up obstacles, (2) if companies ask for ad-
ditional information, and (3) the more users have
to interact with the company. We adjusted the
weights prior to our evaluation based on the pro-
cess (e. g., a priori we did not expect that we would
have to sign affidavits and thus we adjusted the
weight of “offline actions”). In Section 4.5 we de-
scribe the procedure of how users can access per-
sonal data (of the companies in our analysis corpus)
in more detail. We assigned different weights to
the categories and computed a weighted sum of the
number of occurrences of the different events (i. e.,
Ci =Mpre ⋅5+Mpost ⋅2+Aonline ⋅10+Aoffline ⋅30).
The result of the work load determination and com-
parison between inquired companies is given in Fig-
ure 5. The figure shows a clustered version of the
SAR results. We computed the distance between
all points of the same “response status” (e. g., “got
access”) and clustered the points that are close to
each other, according to their euclidean distance.
For each cluster we computed a new point at the
arithmetic mean position of the x-y coordinates of
the original points. The size of each new point
shows how many points were combined to this point
(larger points cluster more points). To increase
readability further, we set the response date of all
companies who replied more than five days after
the second deadline to five days after the deadline.
By the time of the first deadline of the first round
of inquires (July 20th), we got access to our per-
sonal data from 13 companies (36.1%), seven com-
panies (19.4%) told us that they do not store any
personal data, and one company (2.8%) told us
that they would not grant us access to our per-
sonal data because they could not verify our iden-
tity. A reason that a company might not have any
data stored could be that they only capture specific
events that we did not trigger (e. g., clicks on ads).
Another reason why the companies might not have
any data is that we provided a wrong cookie ID.
Note that this unlikely since we pulled the cookie
values directly from the openWPM database. In to-
tal, four (11.1%) companies did not respond once,
and eleven other companies (30.6%) were still pro-
cessing our request by the time of the first deadline.
Thus, above 40% of all inquires where not handled
within the legal period of 30 days.
In round two, we only got access to our data by
eight companies (19.5%), 13 companies told us that
they do not store any data related to the cookie id
(31.7%), and one company told us that they do not
grant us access to the data (2.4%). Nine compa-
nies did not finish the process in the period (22.0%)
and five companies did not respond once (12.2%).
Thus, around 34% did not finish the process in the
legal period of 30 days. During our first and sec-
ond measurement, the amount of companies finish-
ing the SAR process within 30 days did not change
significantly. However, more companies did state
that they do not store data associated to a cookie
ID. It is notable that companies who stated that if
one does not have an user account on their website,
they would not store any data related to a cookie
ID, did not respond to our SAR request within the
legal deadline, in round two. One of these compa-
nies replied with our second deadline stating that
they do not store any data related to the cookie ID.
Until the second deadline four/three more com-
panies finished the process. After our second dead-
line (30 business days after our inquiry), two more
companies shared the collected personal data with
us. As for round two only one more company, that
also took so long in round one, shared the data.
Eight companies interpreted the start date of the
process as the day on which they got all the admin-
istrative data they need to process the inquiry. In
all cases it was virtually impossible for the user to
know upfront that this data was needed since the
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companies only shared the needed documents via
email and did not mention them in their privacy
policies. (i. e., one company replied after seven days
and asked for a signed affidavit. After we provided
the affidavit they told us, another 5 days later, that
they would “start the process” and reply within 30
days.).
In total (after the second deadline of round one),
only 21 of 36 companies (53.9%) shared the col-
lected data, or told us that they do not store any
data, 15 of 36 (41.7%) were still in the process
(or did not respond once), and one company said
that it would not share the data with us because
they cannot properly identify us. In round two
63.9% granted us access or told us that they do not
store any data, 33.3% did not finish the process,
and, similar to round one, one company declined
to grant access since they could not identify us. In
these numbers, we excluded companies that told us
to address a subsidiary /parent company with our
inquiry.
Figure 5 shows that if companies granted access,
we see that work load is often quite low (in both
rounds). In one case with higher work load, in
round 1, a long email exchange (in total 13 emails—
six sent by us) was needed to get access, the other
cases required a copy of the ID and in one case
a signed affidavit. It is notable that the overall
work load in round 2 lowered and companies usu-
ally wrapped up the process faster. The reduction
of work load is because, on the one hand, we did
not have to report broken SAR forms and on the
other hand companies set up less offline obstacles.
Especially during round one, we observed that
companies who claimed not to store any data still
require intense interaction before giving that infor-
mation. Two of these companies required a signed
affidavit and a photocopy of our ID. The third com-
pany, after a longer email conversation, asked to
call the customer support to explain our case in
more detail, still coming to the result that they do
not store any data. All three companies did not
respond in round two.
4.5 Subject Access Request Process
In this section, we describe the different SAR pro-
cesses of the companies in our analysis corpus. We
found major differences how companies handle in-
quiries ranging from not responding at all, over sim-
Figure 5: Comparison of the work load to get access
to personal data companies stored about a user.
The time axis states when we got access to our
data or date when the last mail was received. The
graph differs between companies that gave us access
to personal data they stored (◆), companies that
claimed that they did not store any personal data
(▲), companies that did not grant access (), and
companies that did not grant us access to our data
(●).
ply sending the personal data via email, to sending
(physical) letters which had to include a copy of a
government-issued identification card and a signed
affidavit, stating that the cookie and device belong
to the recipient and only the recipient.
First nine, then ten companies presented us
with additional obstacles to access personal data.
In total we had to sign four (round one)/three
(round two) affidavits, send six/five copies of a
government-issued identity card, and four/seven
other forms of “ID verification” (e. g., provide the
used IP addresses). 26 /25 companies did not set
up any obstacles and four more companies did not
reply once.
Most companies only require the user to provide
the digital identifier (or directly read it from the
browser’s cookie storage) in order to grant access
to the data associated to it. Since most online forms
do not provide all data a company collected about
the user (e. g., they provide the ad segments the
company determined for the user but not the used
IP addresses or visited websites) it is reasonable to
grant access to this data if the cookie ID is pro-
vided. However, online forms come with the risk
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that an adversary might fake the cookie ID and
might get fraudulent access to personal data that is
associated with another individual. An affidavit is
a way to counter this sort of misuse, and one com-
pany stated this as the reason for this additional
step.
As described above, some companies require an
affidavit or a copy of a government ID before they
sent a copy of the data. The GDPR states compa-
nies “should use all reasonable measures to verify
the identity of a data subject who requests access”,
to make sure they do not disclose data to the wrong
person. Asking for identifying information is sup-
posed to add a layer of security when data sub-
jects request a copy of their data. The ad industry
association emphasizes the possibility of this ad-
ditional safeguard [21], but official interpretations
state that data processors should have “reasonable
doubts” before asking for additional data [4]. Those
that request an ID did not explain their doubt and
did not describe how the ID would help them to
verify that the cookie ID is owned by the person
requesting the data related to it.
Access can mostly be requested via email or web
form. Note that by the time we researched the
ways to contact the companies, only six had a form
to access the data. During round one of our mea-
surements, four more companies added such forms.
Since the responses of the forms did not answer
all of our questions (e. g., with whom the data is
shared), we would have had to mail these compa-
nies anyway. It is worth noticing that three of these
forms did not work and we had to report the broken
forms to the companies to use them.
Article 20 of the GDPR states that companies
shall provide the data in a “structured, commonly
used and machine-readable format”. However, it is
user-friendly if the data is provided in a “human
readable” format (e. g., a website) since it is easier
to interpret than multiple lines of delimiter sepa-
rated text. Only one company provided both. We
categorized the received data into two categories:
(1) ’machine’, and (2) ’human’ readable. If the data
is text based and structured in a way that it can
be parsed easily in an intuitive way (e. g., delimiter
separated values), we grouped it into category 1
(e. g., .csv or .txt files). However, if the data was
not in text-based (e. g., a .pdf file) or could not be
parsed straightforward in a reusable way (e. g., a
Website that contains the information), we labeled
it ’human readable’.
In total, we got seven machine and six human
readable responses in round one. As for round
two, we got four machine readable and four human
readable responses. One company provided both
in each round. It appears that each type of ac-
cess has a preferred way to return the data. Forms
often return user-friendly output (e. g., on a web-
site), while data return via mail is exclusively in
text format (e. g., .csv files).
We also analyzed the positions of the employ-
ees who responded to our requests by analyzing
their email signature, if possible. Note that these
numbers did not change for our two rounds—only
that fewer companies replied (to improve readabil-
ity we only use numbers from round 1). Most re-
quests (11) were answered by an anonymous per-
son from the companies “privacy team”, while eight
were handled by the general support team of the
company. According to the job description of the
person handling our request, four were handled by
a person with a legal background (e. g., a General
Counsel or Paralegal). In one case, a person neither
from support nor legal team replied (e. g., a Data
Analyst), in three cases we only got automatic re-
sponses, and in five cases we could not derive the
profession of the person (e. g., they signed the mails
with a name).
Even though several companies did not grant
us access to our personal data, only one of these
companies informed us (in both rounds) that they
would extend the legal period which they are al-
lowed to do, according to the GDPR.
Our data requests were not covered by the stan-
dard business process of some rather large compa-
nies (in terms of annual revenue) and due to this
fact was not handled at all or handled unsatisfac-
torily. Some companies do not have a defined pro-
cess for someone without an account of their ser-
vices who has a privacy-related question, although
all companies are engaged in the collection and
sharing of (unregistered) users they track online.
From a technical point of view, it is hard to argue
to use cookies, which include personal identifiers,
while not storing any data associated with it. Fur-
thermore, the privacy statements of these compa-
nies did state that they use cookies to collect data
about the users’ online activity to perform targeted
advertising. In round two, these companies did not
respond to our inquires.
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Finally, we want to discuss the answers to the four
questions we asked in the inquiries (see Section 4.4).
Only few companies did answer specifically to the
questions we asked. Most of them referred to their
privacy policy or did not give any details at all. In
round two, we got even less concrete answers than
in round one. In round one, overall 21 responses
contained answers to Q1 (data types), six to Q2
(sources), nine for Q3 (profiling), and seven to Q4
(sharing). In round two, 23 companies replayed to
Q1, six to Q2 and Q3, and four to Q4. Note that
companies were not obliged to answer the question
and that we could not check if the companies an-
swered truthfully—if there is no public information
in e. g., the privacy statements that say otherwise
(see also Section 5.2). With respect to Q1 and Q2,
most answers contained references to or parts of the
privacy policy. In the cases (in total three in each
round) when companies told us with whom they
exactly shared our data (i. e., not a general list of
partners), we could find these as edges in our graph.
Nine companies stated a general list of partners in
their privacy policy. For one of these companies we
found two unlisted partners.
As Table 5 (Appendix F) shows, only a few com-
panies (nine /seven) disclose whether or not they
perform profiling there. Only one of the answers,
where the privacy policy was unspecific, clearly
stated that the data is not used for profiling. Six
answers described in some more detail how the data
is processed, and would suffice the GDPR rule that
“meaningful information about the logic involved”
should be provided, for example, one company ex-
plained that they make “automated decisions about
how much to pay for an ad placement and which ad
placements to buy on behalf of advertiser clients.
The result of these decisions is merely that some
fraction of the ads shown on your browser during
your normal browsing activities will have been se-
lected by X ”. Only one company that stated that
they do use profiling did not give any more details,
and one other company stated in their email that
they do not perform profiling, although their pri-
vacy policy says they do. In both cases, clear state-
ments are necessary about whether or not they pro-
filing processes could have any legal effects.
4.5.2 Validation of Disclosed Information
We also analyze if the information about data shar-
ing were actually reflected in our measurement.
Unfortunately, very few companies listed the ac-
tual partners with whom they specifically shared
our personal data but only provided a general list
of partners. We could find all specifically named
sharing partners in our graphs. For one com-
pany, we found three additional partners that were
not named in the privacy policy. If a company
shared clickstream data (three in total), we manu-
ally checked if we actually visited the websites and
if the company did not include some websites that
included that company. We did not find a case in
which a site was missing or another site was added,
that we did not visit.
The shared data is extremely heterogeneous in
format (e. g., .pdf, .csv, .htm, etc.), data con-
tained (e. g., segments assigned to the profile, click-
stream data, IP addresses, etc.), and explanation
of the data (e. g., one company shared an .csv file
with headers named c1 to c36 (sic.), one company
had detailed explanations in an appended docu-
ment, or another company told us that we should
contact them if we had trouble understanding the
data).
In terms of clarity/understandability of the pro-
vided data we also found various different ap-
proaches. Some companies shared straight for-
ward segments they inference from our (artifi-
cially) browsing behaviour (e. g., Segment: Par-
enting - Millennial Mom), others shared cryp-
tic strings without explanation (e. g., Com-
pany Usersync Global), or data that was incor-
rectly formatted somewhere in the process (e. g.,
your hashed ip address: Ubuntu (sic.)) However,
we did not find any instance where data was shared
that was not mentioned to be collected in the pri-
vacy policy and many instances where not all col-
lected data was shared.
The described usability/transparency problems
and solutions how to fix them should be addressed
in future work.
5 Discussion
Our results show that tracking and sharing of in-
formation was reduced, but that there are obsta-
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cles for users during the SARs. We also discuss
limitations and ethical considerations of our work.
Finally, we describe possibilities for future work in
this area.
5.1 Assessment of the SAR Process
The GDPR puts companies in quite a dilemma
when it comes to the usage of cookies. On the one
hand, they want to make it as easy as possible for
users to exercise their right to access their personal
data (e. g., by providing a website that automati-
cally displays all information based on the cookie
set in the browser). On the other hand, they want
to prevent misuse as some companies might leak
long browsing histories of some users since most
keep the data for over a year.
There is a general mismatch between the defini-
tion of personal data about one data subject and
the socio-technical context. For example, it is not
able to model use cases in which a device is used by
multiple persons. It is impossible for these services
to check who used a device and left the possibility
that someone gets access to data that another user
of the same device might have intentionally deleted.
5.2 Limitations
Our measured third-party graphs are only a small
subset of the real third-party relations of a web-
site. A website, even though we tried to mask it,
might detect that a crawler is visiting the website
and embed different objects or none at all. Aside
from randomly scrolling, we do not interact with
the websites which might also influence our results
because some third parties might only be embed-
ded in a user performs a specific task (e. g., if the
user starts a purchase process, a third-party might
be embedded to handle the credit card payment).
In this sense our dataset is biased. However, we
did not aim to capture all third parties, which is
probably impossible in an automatic fashion, but
wanted to asses the user transparency regarding
the collected data of third parties. In our opin-
ion, the dataset is valid for that purpose because it
covers the third parties that are used whenever a
user visits a website which is a common use case of
a website.
We only contacted 39 companies, which is a sub-
set of all online advertising companies. However,
we have shown that the contacted companies come
from different market areas and that they repre-
sent the most prominent companies (in our mea-
surement). Future work should focus on the us-
ability of SARs in a user study and include more
companies.
We cannot check whether or not the compa-
nies answered truthfully and provided all data they
stored, shared, and processed. To check that
we would need to direct access to the services’
databases. For the same reason, we were also not
able to measure what information companies ex-
changes on separate channels besides the synced
IDs.
We do not measure the actual amount of data
shared, but measure the amount of sharing connec-
tions of companies. To measure the actual data
shared by the companies one would need access to
the backend of the sharing companies.
5.3 Ethical Considerations
Since our research includes human subjects (the
persons exercising their rights and the persons re-
sponding to our requests), ethical considerations
need to be taken into account. In this work, we an-
alyze the SAR process of different companies and
not the persons replying in detail. Hence, we do not
see any particular reason why we have to disclose
that we conduct this survey. We did not choose to
debrief most of the companies since we exercise our
right granted by the GDPR and we do not study the
persons replying, but the process of how companies
handle the new GDPR regulation. Note that after
our second deadline (in our first measurement) we
contacted the companies that did not respond at
all or had a poorly designed process, without any
responses.
The data collection in this work is automated
(i. e., we use openWPM). Thus, one might argue that
these data are not related to a person. However,
we run the collection on a computer that is ex-
clusively used by members of our team who also
contacted the companies (i.e., we did not get ac-
cess to any personal data that might be related to
another person and that the data is to some extent
related to this person). Ultimately, we could have
used the cookies of this person, but that would cre-
ate problems when sharing our data since the data
would include non-artificial personal data. When
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contacting the companies, we did not disclose we
conduct a scientific survey, but we did disclose the
real names of two authors in each mail and on the
photocopied IDs. We also answered all of the com-
panies questions truthfully (e. g., if we had been
in contact with a company in any other way aside
from this survey) and reported all problems (e. g.,
data access forms that did not work) that we no-
ticed during the process. Furthermore, none of the
emails were sent out automatically.
5.4 Future Work
The GDPR is entirely new, and therefore there are
still several open research questions, from a cyber-
security point of view, that should be addressed
in future work. Some examples of such work are
briefly discussed in the following.
Usability of SARs: As just mentioned we only
contacted 39 companies. Future work should fo-
cus on the usability of SARs in a user study. In
the study users should try to get access to their
personal data of further companies which helps to
understand how to improve the process.
Adversary SARs: As mentioned in this paper
some companies do not validate the identity of the
data subject but merely read the browser’s cookie
value. An open question is if an adversary could
abuse this by faking the cookie value to get access
to personal information of other individuals.
Privacy By Design: Art. 25 of the GDPR (”Data
protection by design and by default”) requires com-
panies (on a technical and organizational level) to
implement data-protection principles both at the
time of data collection and processing. Future
Work could provide an overview of how companies
realize such measures (i. e., how do companies im-
plement such measures) and check if there is a dis-
tinct difference of collected data before/after a user
gives consent.
Opting-out and Data Erasure: In this work, we
have demonstrated the ID sharing connections of
websites.
Future Work could measure if opting-out has
any effect on this (e. g., user A opts out at service
S1. Does sharing between S1 and other services S2
stop?), and if data erasure propagates through the
network (e. g., if a user asks S1 to delete his/her
personal data will the sharing partners of S1 delete
them as well?).
6 Related Work
Generally speaking, previous work deals with on-
line privacy measurements, online tracking, analy-
ses of ad networks, and work on privacy statements.
6.1 Online Privacy Measurements
Most previous work analyzes online privacy
through measurements — which have all been con-
ducted prior to the GDPR. Gonzales et al. pre-
sented a large-scale study on the use of HTTP cook-
ies [23]. The authors analyzed more than 5.6 bil-
lion HTTP requests over a period of 2.5 months.
They show that, in practice, cookies are much more
sophisticated than simple name=value pairs and
present an algorithm capable of inferring the for-
mat of a cookie with high recall and precision rates.
In 2016, Englehardt and Narayanan published
their work on measuring online tracking [16]. They
introduce the open-source measurement tool open-
WPM which they used to crawl and analyze the
top one million websites on the Internet. They an-
alyzed cookie-based and fingerprint-based tracking
among 13 other types of measurements.
Another large-scale measurement study was con-
ducted by Acar et al. in 2014 [1]. In this paper, the
authors examined canvas fingerprinting, evercook-
ies, and the use of cookie syncing. According to
their study, 5% of the top 100k websites use canvas
fingerprints to identify users.
Most recent are the papers by Papadopoulos
et al. [37] and Karaj et al. [28]. Papadopoulos et al.
performed a study on cookie syncing on a one-year
long dataset including browsing activity from 850
mobile devices. According to their measurement,
over 97% of users are exposed to cookie syncing
and an ID is shared with 3.5 companies on aver-
age. Karaj et al. monitored the online tracking
landscape over a period of ten months of real users
through a browser extension. They try to illumi-
nate the online tracking business and argue that
more transparency and accountability is needed
since users struggle to keep control of their data.
The authors plan to continue their work and make
their data available. Another work from 2016 by Yu
et al. [50] proposed a method for users to identify
unsafe data elements which have the potential to
identify individuals uniquely. Based on their mea-
surements, 95% of all websites embed objects that
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might be used to track users and show that only
22% of the page loads do not transmit privacy-
related data.
The introduced related work measures the track-
ing capabilities and other privacy implications of
websites. We focus on the relations between web-
sites, how hard is to access data a company gath-
ered, and how companies adopted the GDPR which
has not been discussed in the past.
Franken et al. [19] discuss the effectiveness of the
Same Origin Policy. They present a framework to
test the implementation of the policy and show that
protection mechanisms of modern browsers and ex-
tensions can be bypassed.
6.2 Ad Networks
Additional work has been conducted regarding ad
networks. Falahrastegar et al. investigate the con-
nections between third parties focusing on ID shar-
ing [18]. They find that domains show more syncing
activities when a user is logged out and group the
sharing domains based on their content.
The work of Castelluccia et al. is also related to
advertising [9]. The authors introduce a method to
filter targeted ads and infer the users’ interests from
them. Their results indicate that an adversary is
capable of reconstructing user profiles even if she
has access to a limited amount of ads.
Most recently, Bashir et al. introduced a so-
called Inclusion graph that models the diffusion
of online tracking through Real-time Bidding [7].
They show that 52 advertisers or analytic compa-
nies obverse over 90% of an average user’s online
clickstream. The work differs from ours since we
do not want to shed light on the connection of on-
line advertising companies, but measure effects of
the GDPR.
A method to identify server-side information flow
in the ad economy is present by Bashir et al. [6]. To
do so, they use re-targeted ads to reveal informa-
tion flows. Kim et al. recently presented their work
on an ad budget attack [30]. They present an at-
tack on targeted advertisers that legally drain the
advertiser’s ad budget.
6.3 Computer Law and Privacy Poli-
cies
Aside from the presented more technical papers,
our work is related to work that focuses on the legal
aspects of the GDPR. Recently, Libert presented
his work on an automated approach to auditing
disclosure of third-party data collection in websites’
privacy policies [33]. The work shows empirically
that it is unmanageable for a person to read the
privacy policies of the first and third parties.
Gjermundrød et al. presented a GDPR-
compliant framework that allows users to create
a cryptographically verifiable snapshot of her data
trail [22].
Van der Auwermeulen [14] and De Hert et al. [26]
discuss the right to data portability from a com-
puter law point of view. De Hert et al. give a sys-
tematic interpretation of the new right and propose
two approaches on how to interpret the legal term
“data provided” in the GDPR. The authors argue
that a minimal approach, where only data directly
given to the controller (e. g., data entered into a
form) can be seen as “provided”. They also de-
scribe a broad approach which also labels data ob-
served by the controller (e. g., browser fingerprints)
as “provided”. The author proposes to adopt the
extensive approach.
Van der Auwermeulen [14], on the other hand,
compares the European Competition Law with the
U.S. antitrust law if they could be applied in the
case of data portability. The author concludes that
the U.S. law is not favoring data portability while
the European law might be used for such purpose.
Furthermore, the author acknowledges that with
the GDPR, which was just released and not in effect
by the time when the article was published, it is
clear that data subjects have the right to access
their personal data.
7 Conclusion
Granting users the right to regaining control over
their personal data is at heart of the European Gen-
eral Data Protection Regulation. In this work, we
give an overview of the GDPR’s effect on the on-
line ad economy. We show its effect on cookie sync-
ing, compare the “subject access request” process
of different companies, and give an overview of how
19
References
specific companies are connected to each other.
As for the cookie syncing between third parties,
we show that the activities shrink by about 40%
after the GDPR took effect. However, the general
structure of how the third parties are connected
stays more or less the same. This indicates that
the GDPR did not revolutionize the ad ecosystem,
but rather has a direct effect on the amount of in-
formation sharing in the ecosystem.
Our analysis of the SAR processes shows that
while most companies offer easy ways to access the
collected personal data, some companies put up
several obstacles for users to access it. The ob-
stacles range from signed affidavits over providing
additional information (e. g., phone numbers) to
copies of official ID documents. In our view, espe-
cially requesting a copy of an official ID document
is not proportional for the use case. The different
approaches how personal data might be accessed
show the insecurities and different interpretation of
the new law. Looking into the response behavior,
we see that over 58% of the companies did not re-
spond within the legal period of 30 days, but only
one company extended the deadline by two more
months. We could fill official complaints at our lo-
cal Data Protection Authority for these companies.
Finally, we measured how the third parties that
perform cookie syncing are connected. We show
that these companies are mostly arranged in star
typologies, and therefore we find nodes that have
various direct sharing partners, while others only
have one direct partner and many indirect partners.
From this, we draw that a website might risk that it
shares personal data of its users to any third parties
without knowing. From the users’ perspective, this
is highly undesirable especially because the GDPR
does not require companies to name their sharing
partners. In this case, the users have virtually no
chance to keep control over their data. In our ex-
periment, only three companies named us the spe-
cific companies they shared our data with, others
named all of their sharing partners (sometimes hun-
dreds of partners), and other did not disclose any
names at all.
The most important tool for online services to
inform users about their data practices are their
privacy policies, but our results show that not all
companies take the legal obligations seriously. Be-
sides services that miss information required by the
GDPR, we found the majority of privacy policies do
not sufficiently explain what data is shared with
whom.
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A Mail Template
In round one we used the following template to get
in touch with the companies. During round two
we used similar sentences that contained the same
information. We replaced the bold text with in-
formation we extracted from our long term mea-
surement. We pulled the corresponding cookies for
each domain from our measurement logs, and in-
serted the cookie IDs into the mails. As for the
cookie syncing we extracted up to five, chosen ran-
domly if necessary, instances of such syncing and
inserted them into the mail.
Subject:
Request for personal data and additional
information
Body:
Hi,
I noticed that there is a cookie stored in my
browser associated with the domains
Domain 1 and Domain 2 which are owned
by your company. Citing my European
privacy rights, I would like to ask you to
answer the following questions:
1) What information about me/associated
with that cookie do you store and process?
2) Where did you get that information from?
Did you get it from third parties?
3) Do you use the data to perform profiling?
I’d also like to kindly request a copy of the
data.
The following cookies stored in my browser
are associated with domains I found to be
associated with your company:
On domain: Domain 1 key: ’id key 1’ and
value: personal identifier 1
On domain: Domain 2 key: ’id key 2’ and
value: personal identifier 2
Another question I have is:
4) With whom do you share what information
and how? For example I saw that you used
the following IDs with your partners:
partner: Sync Partner 1 using the key:
’sync key 1’ and value: ’sync id 1’
partner: Sync Partner 1 using the key:
’sync key 2’ and value: ’sync id 2’
Thanks for your support,
First Name Last Name
B Graph characteristics
Table 2 presents general graph characteristics of
our conducted measurements. The longest possi-
ble distance between two nodes, modularity and
medium degree of the graphs remains more or less
stable. Nevertheless, the number of communities is
reduced from 68 in M#1 to 48 communities in M#2
and M#3, and even 43 communities in M#4. The
average distance between node pairs in the graph
indicates the average path length. These values
do not change much across the three graphs we
measured after the GDPR took effect. We draw
from this that the GDPR did not revolutionize the
ecosystem.
C Analysis Corpus
Table 3 shows the companies included in our anal-
ysis corpus. In two cases (Turn and BidSwitch)
parent organizations replied to our inquiries, in one
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diameter medium modularity avg. avg. comm.
degree clustering path
coefficient length
20 (M#1) 9 2.975 0.576 0.234 3.125 68
21 (M#2) 8 2.619 0.609 0.177 3.098 48
26 (M#3) 8 2.518 0.622 0.181 3.234 48
28 (M#4) 9 2.432 0.699 0.154 3.349 43
34 (M#5) 10 2.291 0.659 0.158 3.192 37
38 (M#6) 10 2.314 0.717 0.074 3.931 26
43 (M#7) 9 2.36 0.714 0.071 3.5 38
Table 2: Characteristics of our graphs w/o isolated
nodes.
case a subsidiary replied (FreeWheel) instead of
the inquired company, and in one case (RTL Group)
we were told to address our inquiry to a subsidiary
(SpotX). Thus, our final corpus consists of 39 com-
panies.
Supply-Side Platforms
Improve Digital Smart AdServer AppNexus
★
Rubicon Project
Index Exchange Sovrn
Demand-Side Platforms
TripleLift MediaMath Adform
♣
AppNexus
★
OpenX DataXu IponWeb (BidSwitch)
Sizmek Amobee (Turn)
Advertising Companies
The Trade Desk Sharethrough NeuStar Criteo
Acxiom SpotX
†
Quantcast
Data Management Platforms
Lotame Adform
♣
Media Innovation Group
Drawbridge
Further Companies
Google Verizon FreeWheel (Comcast)
Oracle Adobe RTL Group
†
Microsoft
comScore Twitter Harris Insights & Analytics
Facebook Amazon
Table 3: The companies of our analysis corpus
grouped by their respective business field(s). App-
Nexus (★) and Adform (♣) run two services and
are therefore listed twice. SpotX is a subsidiary of
the RTL Group (†).
D Analysis Corpus Classifica-
tion
Table 4 lists direct syncing partners of our analysis
corpus during our four measuring points (i. e., With
how many partners did a third party sync cookie
IDs). Furthermore, the table shows the types of
the nodes. (i. e., outer, balanced, center, and iso-
lated). The rows ’Remaining Nodes’ show the mean
syncing relations from all third parties that are not
present in our analysis corpus.
For most third parties, the direct partners are re-
duced over the course of our measuring points. The
biggest reduction is attributed to Google and the
only exception is Adform. Interestingly, the num-
ber of direct connections from M2 to M3 increases
again in some cases, for example for Criteo. In
principle, the behavior of indirect partners is com-
parable to the behavior of direct partners which is
not surprising, as the partners of the partners are
dependent on the direct partners. Meaning that
if the direct partners of one node are reduced the
indirect partners are also likely to be reduced. In
general, this means that personal data of users are
less likely to be shared unnoticed with multiple par-
ties.
E Graphs
Figure 6 displays all third parties (nodes) and
their cookie syncing relations edges) observed dur-
ing four of our conducted measurements (before
(M#1), right after (M#2), one month after M#3),
and two months after (M#4) the GDPR took ef-
fect). The darker a node is, the more important
it is according to the PageRank algorithm. The
edges are also coloured according to their impor-
tance. The darker the edge, the more important it
is. A comparison of the graphs reveals a reduction
from M#1 to M#2 and to M#3 as to M#4.
F Privacy Policy Overview
Table 5 provides a summary of the privacy policies
of the companies in our data set. It lists the most
important tracking and GDPR-related attributes
and what information are disclosed.
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Analysis Corpus
# Third Party Direct Partners Type
M#1 M#2 M#3 M#4 M#1 M#2 M#3 M#4
1. Google 195 138 118 112 c c c c
2. Facebook 11 11 9 9 c c c c
3. Amazon 31 19 17 1 c c c b
4. Verizon 18 10 10 6 c c c c
5. AppNexus 69 42 40 44 o c c c
6. Oracle 30 31 27 18 c c c b
7. Adobe 11 8 5 4 c c b b
8. Smart AdServer 1 1 isolated o b isolated
9. RTL Group 16 8 7 10 c c c c
10. Improve Digital 2 1 1 iso b b o iso
11. MediaMath 16 7 8 10 c c c c
12. TripleLift 5 1 2 4 b o b b
13. RubiconProject 12 isolated c isolated
14. The Trade Desk 12 7 5 6 c c b c
15. ShareThrough 2 isolated b isolated
16. Neustar isolated 10 isolated c
17. Drawbridge 1 iso 1 iso o iso e iso
18. Adform 1 14 11 13 o c c c
19. Bidswitch 3 5 3 2 b b b b
20. Harris Insights & Analytics 4 2 2 2 b b b b
21. Acxiom 12 2 6 5 c b c b
22. Index Exchange 6 4 3 2 c b b b
23. Criteo 6 1 4 2 c o b b
24. OpenX 16 7 6 4 c b b e
25. DataXu 7 6 4 3 b c b b
26. Lotame 2 3 3 2 o b b b
27. FreeWheel isolated isolated
28. Amobee isolated isolated
29. comScore 25 20 20 17 c c c b
30. spotX isolated isolated
31. Sovrn isolated 2 isolated b
32. Sizmek 23 14 18 2 c c c b
33. Twitter isolated 2 iso isolated o iso
34. Microsoft iso 1 iso iso iso o iso iso
35. Media Innovation Group 2 1 2 2 b o o o
36. Comcast 5 4 4 4 b b b o
37. Turn 2 2 2 4 b b b b
38. Quantcast 2 2 1 1 b b o o
39. IponWeb iso 31 isolated iso c isolated
Remaining Nodes
Mean Direct Partners Nodes
Node Type M#1 M#2 M#3 M#4 M#1 M#2 M#3 M#4
Outer corners (o) 1.31 1.26 1.22 1.33 268 183 164 190
Center nodes (c) 12.56 10 9.33 7.4 25 8 6 5
Balanced (b) 2.11 2.13 2.09 2.21 205 135 127 106
Table 4: Synchronization relations of our analysis
corpus. ’Direct Partners’ indicates the amount of
direct ID syncing. The types of the nodes outer
(o), balanced (b), center (c), and isolated (iso) are
displayed as well.
(a) M#1 (b) M#2
(c) M#3
(d) M#4
Figure 6: Graphs of our measurements w/o isolated
nodes.
25
C
om
p
an
y
L
eg
al
B
as
is
*
S
h
ar
ed
D
at
a
3r
d
C
O
*
S
en
si
ti
ve
D
at
a
P
ro
fi
li
n
g
R
et
en
ti
on
*
P
ar
tn
er
s*
D
at
a
A
cc
es
s*
D
N
T
V
er
si
on
G
o
og
le
a,
b
,c
,f
u
n
sp
ec
ifi
ed
y
n
.m
.
n
.m
u
n
sp
ec
ifi
ed
7
ac
co
u
n
t
n
.m
.
05
/2
01
8
F
ac
eb
o
ok
a,
b
,c
,d
,e
,f
u
n
sp
ec
ifi
ed
y
y
n
.m
.
d
iff
er
s
ca
te
g
or
ie
s
a
cc
ou
n
t
n
.m
.
04
/2
0
18
A
m
az
on
n
.m
.
u
n
sp
ec
ifi
ed
n
.m
.
n
.m
.
n
.m
.
n
.m
.
ca
te
go
ri
es
n
.m
.
n
.m
.
08
/
20
1
7
V
er
iz
on
a,
b
,c
,f
u
n
sp
ec
ifi
ed
y
n
.m
.
n
.m
u
n
sp
ec
ifi
ed
32
9
w
eb
si
te
,
em
ai
l
n
.m
.
05
/2
01
8
A
p
p
N
ex
u
s
a,
f
u
n
sp
ec
ifi
ed
y
n
.m
.
n
.m
3-
60
d
,
u
p
to
18
m
2
30
9
w
eb
si
te
n
.m
.
05
/
20
18
O
ra
cl
e
a,
c,
f
u
n
sp
ec
ifi
ed
y
h
ea
lt
h
re
la
te
d
n
.m
.
12
-1
8m
ca
te
go
ri
es
w
eb
si
te
y
05
/2
0
18
A
d
ob
e
a,
b
,c
,f
u
n
sp
ec
ifi
ed
y
n
.m
.
y
u
n
ti
l
op
t-
ou
t
ca
te
go
ri
es
em
a
il
,
fo
rm
n
05
/2
01
8
S
m
ar
t
A
d
S
er
ve
r
a,
f
u
n
sp
ec
ifi
ed
y
n
.m
.
y
1d
-1
3
m
ca
te
go
ri
es
em
ai
l
n
.m
.
05
/
20
18
R
T
L
G
ro
u
p
a,
c,
f
u
n
sp
ec
ifi
ed
y
n
.m
.
n
.m
.
as
lo
n
g
as
n
ec
es
sa
ry
ca
te
g
or
ie
s
em
ai
l
n
.m
.
u
n
cl
ea
r
Im
p
ro
ve
D
ig
it
al
a
li
st
ed
y
n
.m
.
n
.m
.
90
d
ca
te
g
or
ie
s
em
a
il
y
05
/
20
18
M
ed
ia
M
at
h
f
u
n
sp
ec
ifi
ed
y
h
ea
lt
h
re
la
te
d
y
u
p
to
1
3m
ca
te
g
or
ie
s
em
ai
l
n
.m
.
0
5/
2
01
8
T
ri
p
le
li
ft
a,
f
u
n
sp
ec
ifi
ed
y
a
sk
to
av
o
id
n
.m
a
s
lo
n
g
a
s
n
ec
es
sa
ry
ca
te
go
ri
es
w
eb
si
te
n
0
5/
2
01
8
R
u
b
ic
on
P
ro
je
ct
a,
b
,c
,f
u
n
sp
ec
ifi
ed
y
n
.m
.
n
.m
.
90
-3
66
d
ca
te
go
ri
es
fo
rm
n
.m
.
05
/2
01
8
T
h
e
T
ra
d
e
D
es
k
a,
f
u
n
sp
ec
ifi
ed
U
S
n
o
t
al
lo
w
ed
n
.m
.
18
m
,
3y
ag
g
re
ga
te
d
ca
te
g
or
ie
s
w
eb
si
te
n
.m
.
10
/2
0
18
S
h
ar
eT
h
ro
u
gh
a,
b
,c
,f
u
n
sp
ec
ifi
ed
y
n
.m
.
y
1
3m
ca
te
go
ri
es
em
ai
l
n
.m
.
05
/2
0
18
N
eu
st
ar
n
.m
.
ID
s,
se
gm
en
ts
U
S
n
ot
a
ll
ow
ed
n
13
m
+
1
8m
ag
gr
eg
a
te
d
ca
te
go
ri
es
em
ai
l
n
.m
.
08
/2
0
18
D
ra
w
b
ri
d
ge
n
.m
.
ID
s,
se
gm
en
ts
U
S
h
ea
lt
h
re
la
te
d
n
.m
.
n
.m
.
ca
te
g
or
ie
s
em
ai
l
n
08
/2
0
18
A
d
fo
rm
a,
f
u
n
sp
ec
ifi
ed
y
n
o
t
a
ll
ow
ed
n
.m
.
13
m
33
fo
rm
/e
m
ai
l
n
.m
.
u
n
cl
ea
r
B
id
sw
it
ch
a,
b
,c
,f
u
n
sp
ec
ifi
ed
y
n
.m
.
n
.m
.
“
as
lo
n
g
as
n
ec
es
sa
ry
”
ca
te
g
or
ie
s
n
.m
.
n
.m
.
05
/2
0
18
H
ar
ri
s
I
&
A
a
a,
c
li
st
ed
y
y
n
.m
.
p
u
rp
os
e
fu
lfi
ll
ed
ca
te
go
ri
es
em
ai
l
n
.m
.
07
/2
0
18
A
cx
io
m
a,
f
ca
te
go
ri
es
y
n
o
n
.m
.
u
n
sp
ec
ifi
ed
ca
te
g
or
ie
s
re
gi
st
er
n
.m
.
0
5/
2
01
8
In
d
ex
E
x
ch
an
ge
n
.m
.
ag
gr
eg
at
ed
on
ly
U
S
n
o
n
o
1
3m
ca
te
g
or
ie
s
w
eb
si
te
n
09
/2
01
8
C
ri
te
o
a
ag
gr
eg
at
ed
y
n
o
n
.m
.
1
3m
61
em
ai
l/
m
ai
l
n
05
/2
0
18
O
p
en
X
a,
f
u
n
sp
ec
ifi
ed
U
S
n
.m
.
n
.m
u
n
sp
ec
ifi
ed
ca
te
g
or
ie
s
em
ai
l
y
05
/
20
18
D
at
aX
U
a,
b
,c
,f
b
eh
av
io
u
ra
l
y
n
o
t
in
E
U
n
.m
.
13
m
ca
te
g
or
ie
s
em
ai
l
n
06
/2
0
18
L
ot
am
e
n
.m
.
u
n
sp
ec
ifi
ed
U
S
h
ea
lt
h
re
la
te
d
n
.m
1
3m
ca
te
g
or
ie
s
w
eb
si
te
y
09
/
20
18
F
re
eW
h
ee
l
a,
b
,f
u
n
sp
ec
ifi
ed
Y
n
.m
.
n
.m
.
18
m
ca
te
go
ri
es
em
ai
l
n
05
/
20
18
A
m
ob
ee
a,
f
u
n
sp
ec
ifi
ed
U
S
n
.m
.
y
13
m
ca
te
g
or
ie
s
w
eb
si
te
n
.m
.
0
6/
2
01
8
co
m
S
co
re
a,
b
,c
,f
u
n
sp
ec
ifi
ed
y
n
.m
.
n
.m
.
n
.m
.
ca
te
go
ri
es
w
eb
si
te
n
.m
.
1
2/
2
01
7
sp
ot
X
a,
f
li
st
ed
n
.m
n
.m
n
.m
.
1
8m
65
w
eb
si
te
y
u
n
cl
ea
r
S
ov
rn
a,
c,
f
n
.m
y
n
.m
.
y
n
.m
.
u
n
sp
ec
if
c
w
eb
fo
rm
n
.m
.
05
/2
01
8
S
iz
m
ek
a,
b
,c
,f
se
gm
en
ts
y
n
ot
k
n
ow
in
g
ly
n
.m
.
1
3m
u
n
sp
ec
ifi
ed
w
eb
si
te
m
ix
ed
05
/2
0
18
T
w
it
te
r
a,
b
,c
,f
li
st
ed
y
n
o
t
a
ll
ow
ed
n
.m
.
18
m
16
ac
co
u
n
t
n
05
/
20
18
M
ic
ro
so
ft
a,
b
,c
,f
u
n
sp
ec
ifi
ed
y
y
n
.m
,
13
m
>
9
a
cc
ou
n
t
n
10
/
20
18
M
ed
ia
In
n
ov
at
io
n
a
u
n
sp
ec
ifi
ed
U
S
n
n
.m
.
14
m
p
ar
tn
er
s
n
.m
.
n
.m
.
09
/
20
1
1
Q
u
an
tc
as
t
a,
f,
li
st
ed
y
n
o
t
in
E
U
n
.m
.
13
m
3
3
w
eb
si
te
n
.m
.
0
5/
2
01
8
T
ab
le
5:
O
ve
rv
ie
w
of
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
av
ai
la
b
le
in
p
ri
va
cy
p
o
li
ci
es
.
*
m
a
rk
s
in
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
th
a
t
is
re
q
u
ir
ed
b
y
th
e
G
D
P
R
.
L
e
g
a
l
B
a
s
i
s
re
fe
rs
to
th
e
se
ct
io
n
s
in
A
rt
ic
le
6
of
th
e
G
D
P
R
:
(a
)
co
n
se
n
t,
(b
)
co
n
tr
a
ct
,
(c
)
le
g
a
l
o
b
li
g
a
ti
o
n
,
(e
)
p
u
b
li
c,
(f
)
le
g
it
im
a
te
in
te
re
st
;
n
.m
.
=
n
o
t
m
en
ti
on
ed
a
H
a
rr
is
In
si
g
h
t
is
th
e
p
a
re
n
t
co
m
p
a
n
y,
b
u
t
fo
r
th
e
a
n
a
ly
si
s
w
e
re
ff
er
ed
to
th
e
p
ri
v
a
cy
p
o
li
cy
o
f
th
ei
r
o
n
li
n
e
a
d
v
er
ti
si
n
g
su
b
si
d
ia
ry
v
is
u
a
lD
N
A
26
